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Abstract
Video chat systems such as Chatroulette have become in-
creasingly popular as a way to meet and converse one-on-
one via video and audio with other users online in an open
and interactive manner. At the same time, security and pri-
vacy concerns inherent in such communication have been
little explored. This paper presents one of the first investiga-
tions of the privacy threats found in such video chat systems,
identifying three such threats, namely de-anonymization at-
tacks, phishing attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks. The
paper further describes countermeasures against each of
these attacks.
1 Introduction
Video chat systems have become increasingly popular,
and include such systems as Chatroulette [1], Random-
Dorm [2], and Omegle [3]. Statistics show that membership
in for example Chatroulette has grown by 500 % since 2009.
The motivations for using such systems include entertain-
ment, seeking feedback, the desire for companionship, etc.
In such systems, individuals are matched with other individ-
uals with whom they can converse via video, audio and text
simultaneously. In most such systems, the users do not typi-
cally know a priori the other person that they will be matched
with for video conversations.
To illuminate the discussion, consider Chatroulette,
in which a user will direct their Web browser to
www.chatroulette.com to download the Web page for the
video chat. The Web page will request the identity of another
user from the Chatroulette server, which is then returned in
the form of the other user’s IP address. ”Flash” code embed-
ded within the page then establishes a direct video session
with the IP host of the other user, sending local camera and
microphone data to the remote user while receiving that re-
mote user’s video and audio data. When a user clicks ”Next”,
then the browser will request a new user (their IP address),
thus establishing a new video connection. In this example,
the server is chiefly involved in supplying IP addresses, and
is not involved in relaying any video data. RandomDorm and
Omegle exhibit similar architectures.
Privacy has emerged as a concern in these video chat en-
vironments. The approximate locations of Chatroulette users
can be obtained via a geo-IP lookup, as has been shown
at Chatroulettemap.com [4]. Indeed, the founder of Cha-
troulette states ”There is a certain level of anonymity on the
Chatroulette that Chatroulette Map takes away” [5]. In addi-
tion, conversations that were assumed to be between only a
pair of chatters have also shown up unexpectedly on a pop-
ular viral video on Youtube, in which a piano player impro-
vises songs based on who he sees on Chatroulette. This video
was briefly taken down in part out of privacy concerns [6, 7].
While it is likely unreasonable to expect such systems to per-
fectly guarantee privacy, it is clear that there is an expectation
among the video chat users that such systems will preserve at
least some degree of their privacy. Sites like Chatroulette are
concerned enough to have begun addressing some of these
privacy issues [8].
This paper presents an initial investigation of some addi-
tional privacy problems beyond what has been exposed pre-
viously in the general class of video chat systems, and iden-
tifies three specific classes of attack on such systems while
also proposing countermeasures to address these threats. In
particular, we find that such systems are subject to enhanced
de-anonymization attacks, phishing attacks, and man-in-the-
middle attacks. We propose preliminary solutions to deal
with these attacks, and observe that there is substantial room
for improvement on these techniques. Overall, our belief
is that further privacy research is needed to protect this key
emerging class of video chat applications. 1
2 Related Work
Video privacy issues in the media space have been well
investigated and several defense mechanisms have been enu-
merated over the past few years. All of them focus on main-
taining privacy by using a video blurring method. Over the
past decade, video privacy has been usually discussed either
in the context of video surveilance systems [9][10][11] or in
the context of home-based video conferencing[12][13].
[9] uses a region-based transform-domain scrambling
technique to blur the entire video and thus preserve privacy
in the context of a video surveillance system. The main
drawback of this work is that no clearly observable region
remains, i.e. it obscures the whole scene of a video. To
address this issue, [10] proposes a respectful cameras sys-
tem that harnesses statistical learning and classification to
obscure faces with solid ellipsoidal overlays and maximize
the remaining observable region of the scene. [11] employs
a robust face detection and tracking algorithm to obscure hu-
man faces in the video. One of the benefits for only blurring
an individual’s face is that the video surveilance system is
still able to monitor what is happening in a specific area.
In the context of home-based video conferencing, re-
searchers have used similar methods to address video pri-
vacy issues. To minimize the accompanying loss of privacy,
[12][13] describe several image filtering techniques that fil-
1We have obtained approval from the founder of Chatroulette,
Andrey Ternovskiy, to reveal the techniques described in this paper.
ter the communicated video streams rather than broadcasting
clear video. One purpose to obscure the scene in a video (in
the context of home-based video conferencing) is to prevent
other video participants from identifying what a participant
is doing and what he is wearing. Another objective of using
blurring technique in a home-based video conferencing is to
make a given scene appropriate for a colleague to view.
Though video blurring tachniques can work appropriately
as well as can protect users’ privacy in both contexts, they are
not appropriate for the new generation of video chat services
such as Chatroulette, and in fact, may significantly harm the
usability of these new generation of video chat services. This
is because the main function of the new generation of video
chat services is to bring a user face-to-face via webcam with
an interesting person from another corner of the planet. We
can imagine that if the services provide users with all blur-
ring faces, the users who use these services will gradually
lose their interest in talking to others. We conducted a small-
scale experiment using the Chatroulette platform in April
2010. The experimental results have shown that only less
than 20% of the users stayed to talk when a user blurred his
face.
3 Breaching Privacy
Based on our experience with Chatroulette and other sim-
ilar systems, we outline three attacks against video chat en-
vironments.
3.1 Enhanced De-anonymization Attack
The most direct attack against video chat environments is
to identify users’ geographical location. By using a propri-
etary IP address lookup database and technology, adversaries
are able to determine a user geographical location. Cha-
troulette harnesses Adobe’s Stratus platform as a means of
reducing their bandwidth costs while providing video ser-
vices. In general, Chatroulette handles the behind the scenes
handshakes involved in making two clients connect, but the
actual connection is a direct, peer-to-peer link between the
two users. While a connection is established between two
peers, audio and video streams encapsulated in UDP streams
start to exchange data. An adversary can easily retrieve the
source IP address from the header of a packet and use a geo-
IP mapping service to find the approximate location of the
user. These results have been placed on a Google map at
chatroulettemap.com [4].
Anonymity can be further compromised by correlating
this location information with other seemingly innocuous in-
formation that might be revealed in a casual video chat. For
example, after an adversary has determined the approximate
location of the other user, the adversary can further engage in
some small talk. One of the most common conversations that
people have with each other on chatroulette is “How are you
doing today?” followed by “what’s your name?”. Answering
the questions correctly implies that one reveals one’s private
information.
Correlating these answers with location can very quickly
allow an adversary to converge on the user’s identity, even
though the user thought that revealing just their first name
would keep their identity secret. For example, adversaries
can easily search on Facebook by a user’s first name and the
physical location (searches can be further refined based on
school and workplace). Although the query issued by the
adversary might return tens (even several hundreds) of re-
sults related to the name and general physical location (the
number of returned results depends on the uniqueness of the
name, that is, Rick is more common than Xinyu on Face-
book), the adversary can easily and quickly filter the per-
sonal profiles by comparing the appearance on screen with
the thumbnail pictures shown in one’s social profile.
To validate our enhanced de-anonymization attack, we
conducted an experiment over the Chatroulette platform. To
do this experiment, we implemented software to retrieve the
incoming and outgoing UDP packets. A screenshot of this
software has been provided in Figure 1. Based on the packets
that the software collects, the software displays the top-five
UDP communications (here we rank UDP communications
based on the volume of UDP packets) to distinguish which
UDP traffic is associated with the Chatroulette application.
Notice that other applications running on the machine may
also generate UDP traffic but the volume of the traffic is usu-
ally lower than the volume of traffic generated by other appli-
cations. Furthermore, our software utilizes the GeoIP library
to convert an IP address to a physical address. We verified
that it was possible to apply reverse geo-location mapping
to obtain a remote chatter’s geographical location, e.g. Den-
ver, Colorado. We could then search Facebook using the first
name provided along with the location to retrieve a narrowed
down search of a couple hundred names. We found this list
could be manually but quickly searched in real time by com-
paring photos to uncover the identity of the person while the
conversation was ongoing. The user’s identity could be re-
vealed before the conversation had finished. Thus, an indi-
vidual who believes that they are sufficiently anonymized by
just revealing their first name was not safe from having their
identity revealed using this enhanced de-anonymization at-
tack.
3.2 Phishing Attack
In this type of attack, an adversary poses as an attractive
person to solicit potentially sensitive information from other
chat users, such as their name, Skype account, Facebook ac-
count, telephone numbers, etc. Unlike traditional phishing
attacks, which are typically carried out by email or by hijack-
ing instant messages[14], an adversary in a video chat sys-
tem can simply play a video that he prepared in advance to
lure unsuspecting individuals into a conversation with the ad-
versary, potentially divulging sensitive information. In this
type of attack, an adversary replaces their own video with
that of an attractive young lady or a gentleman. For exam-
ple, prior work over the Chatroulette platform has shown that
young ladies are more likely to be accosted by Chatroulette
male users [15]. The adversary shows a largely head-and-
shoulders shot that appears plausibly to be interacting every
now and then with the screen, perhaps typing in something
on occasion. The audio is disabled, and the adversary claims
this is either because he is working from a desktop, which
typically doesn’t have a built-in microphone, or they cannot
speak English well and would prefer text messages. Thus,
the primary interaction is with text messages through the chat
system. In our tests, most of the users disabled audio, and no
Figure 1. A screenshot of the software which has been used in deanonymization attacks.
users asked us to reenable our disabled audio.
As a result, the remote user is deceived into believing they
are interacting with an attractive approachable person. Dur-
ing the conversation, the adversary attempts to steer a polite
conversation, gains the user’s trust and thus can seek to ex-
tract a user’s private information, such as name, Facebook
account, Skype account and even telephone number, etc. For
example, the adversary can attempt to steer a casual conver-
sation, bring sexual innuendos into a conversation and use
a screen recording program to record the conversation. Fur-
thermore, the adversary can utilize the victim’s private in-
formation to search for the victim’s social relationships (e.g.
using the victim’s Facebook account to identify his friends).
This information can be used to blackmail the victim, e.g.
the adversary may threaten to broadcast the recorded conver-
sation to the victim’s friends or family. Even worse, the true
attacker can remain anonymous hidden behind their phishing
personae.
To investigate the feasibility of the phishing attack, we
designed an experiment in which we substituted a fake video
personae in place of the normal webcam. In our experiment,
we first recorded a video in which a lady sitting in front of
the webcam pretends to chat to a video chat user. Then, we
redirected the video chat software to obtain the video from
the recorded video stream, rather than the webcam. For ex-
ample, in Chatroulette, the Flash software asks you which
webcam you’d like to use, and there is an option for se-
lecting a virtual webcam. One only needs to play the fake
video in a separate window, capture and transfer this video
as the source of the virtual webcam. The resulting software
is shown in Figure 2.
To further disguise the adversary, we emulated a low-
bandwidth network. We edited the video that we prepared by
changing the frame frequency. To do this, we select partial
frames to form our video. In our experiment, we only retain
those frames which happens every 2 seconds. For example, a
raw 6-second video contains 144 frames. We only retain the
1st, 48th, 96th and 144th frame. Intuitively, a Chatroulette
user is not able to see a continuous video stream and thus
he may think that the connection with the adversary is ex-
periencing a slow speed. Another reason why we slow down
our video is that an adversary can prevent a Chatroulette user
from asking the adversary to verify that the video is real (e.g.
a Chatroulette user may ask the adversary to raise her hand).
Since the video is not continuous, the adversary can easily
make an excuse – the motion of raising hand may not be able
to be transmitted to the Chatroulette user. In practice, one of
our observations over a one-hour experiment is that only one
out of fifteen chatroulette users asked us to verify the real-
ity of the video. And after we made the excuse to explain the
reason why he cannot see our rising hand, he simply believed
our excuse. This confirms that it is possible to deceive un-
suspecting users, and even one more wary user, as to whom
they are conversing with by substituting a poor quality video.
Though we did not proceed further to extract personal in-
formation, we believe that once an adversary has gained the
other user’s trust, especially with a photogenic presence, then
psychologically it becomes much easier to ask them to di-
vulge some personal information, say asking to friend them
on Facebook, or contact them via Skype. In that respect, the
bar is lowered for using the obtained information for nefari-
ous purposes.
3.3 Man-in-the-Middle Attack
Our observation is that video chat users can become vul-
nerable to man-in-the-middle (MIM) attacks. While two
video chat users may believe that they are talking directly
to one another, it is possible to insert a man-in-the-middle
who can eavesdrop on their conversation without the two
end users being aware that their conversation is being ob-
Figure 2. Using a video to carry out a phishing attack.
served and/or recorded. Combined with de-anonymization
attacks, then it is possible to compromise a user’s identity
and threaten such observed/recorded users with blackmail.
An MIM attack would work as follows: an adversary
could open up two video chat windows, one talking with re-
mote User 1, and another talking with remote User 2. Then,
using a similar mechanism to the phishing attack, the ad-
versary could substitute User 2’s video stream in place of
its own webcam stream to User 1. Similarly, the adversary
could substitute User 1’s stream in place of its own stream to
User 2. By crossing the streams, the adversary can observe
the dialogue between Users 1 and 2 without either of the two
users realizing their conversation is being observed.
Figure 3. A video relay based man-in-the-middle attack.
We term this type of MIM attack a video relay (VR) at-
tack. Figure 3 illustrates the process of this VR-based MIM
attack. An adversary uses a virtual camera program to re-
lay victims’ video streams to each other. In this case, the
adversary relays the victim (the person shown in the top-left
window) Alice’s video stream to the victim Bob (the person
shown in the top-right window) by using a virtual camera
program. Similarly, Bob’s video stream is redirected to Al-
ice. Notice that a VR-based MIM attack requires the adver-
sary to utilize two different virtual camera programs for the
reason that one of the victims will see his own video stream
if only one virtual camera program is used. To illustrate this,
let’s take a look at an example. Suppose that an adversary
uses a single virtual camera program to redirect Alice’s video
stream to Bob. Without doubt, Bob is able to see Alice’s
video. However, since the connection session between Alice
and the adversary also uses the same virtual camera program,
Alice will see her own video showing in the partner window.
We believe Chatroulette as currently implemented is vul-
nerable to such MIM attacks. An adversary is able to con-
nect to two or more Chatroulette users simultaneously. By
redirecting conversation content (including video, audio and
text content) to another Chatroulette user, the adversary is
able to invisibly eavesdrop on the conversation between two
victims.
In addition to the VR-based MIM attack, a more gen-
eral packet relay (PR) attack is possible. For example, Cha-
troulette uses the Real-Time Media Flow Protocol (RTMFP),
which is encapsulated in a UDP message, which indicates
that the video and audio messages exchanged between a pair
of Chatroulette users are encrypted. In order to achieve PR-
based MIM attacks, an adversary therefore cannot simply re-
lay the messages that he received from one victim to another
victim because each pair of Chatroulette users share different
keys. Instead, the adversary has to first decrypt the message
exchanged between him and one victim, use the key shared
with another victim to encrypt the message and then send
the new encrypted message to the other victim. Thus, even if
Chatroulette used https with TLS/SSL to encrypt both video
sessions, the MIM can decrypt an arriving stream from a user
and reencrypt the data as an output stream to the other user.
Generally, the PR-based MIM attack is more holistic than
VR-based attacks for the reason that the PR-based attack
can also relay victim text and audio messages while the VR-
based attack has to disable the audio devices and even may
involve human interruption, e.g. manually redirecting vic-
tims’ text messages.
3.4 Discussion
1. In a video chat system, users (knowingly) reveal video
of their faces. Do these users have any expectation of secu-
rity or privacy while using such systems?
In any social networking system, or in fact any Internet
service, users are generally well-aware of the fact that some
of their private information will be revealed. However, there
is a general belief that only the information that a user (ex-
plicitly) discloses via these systems is revealed and it is re-
vealed to only to those users that this user authorizes. Indeed,
systems such as Facebook and Skype attempt to provide sys-
tem support for such security and privacy. We believe that
the users of video chat systems such as Chatroulette have
such expectations. For example, it is reasonable to assume
that a Chatroulette user believes that he/she is chatting with
a real user, or no one else other than the user at other end is
seeing/receiving his/her information.
2. With today’s Web, including face matching technology,
is it reasonable to expect a video chat service such as Cha-
troulette to still have privacy?
Most current social networking services distinguish be-
tween public and private profiles of a user. A public profile
is generally available to all users, while access to the pri-
vate profile is restricted. Chatroulette is similar. Video of an
online user’s face is available to all users, but contents ex-
changed after a video chat session has been established must
be authenticated, secure and private. Indeed, correlating pub-
lic information available from one website (e.g. face video
in Chatroulette) with information available from other web-
sites can be done and this may reveal additional information
about a user. However, this is a general problem facing all
Internet services that care about privacy, and is not unique to
Chatroulette.
3. If a video chat service is anonymous for both sides, why
does it matter that eavesdropping using man-in-the-middle
attack is feasible?
A key advantage an attacker gains by launching the
above-mentioned man-in-the-middle attack is anonymity.
The two users that are led to believe that they are chatting
directly have no way to determine the identity of the attacker.
4. How do we deal with the audio stream apart from the
video stream?
All attacks, apart from the PR-based MIM attack, require
an adversary to disable audio devices. Unlike a laptop in
which a microphone is usually embedded, it is quite com-
mon that a desktop is not equipped with a built-in micro-
phone. Therefore, disabling the audio input device (i.e. mi-
crophone) does not influence the usability of Chatroulette.
Furthermore, based on our observations, more than half of
Chatroulette users either disable or are not equipped with au-
dio input devices. Therefore, all attacks described above are
not easily detected when the adversary disables his audio in-
put devices.
5. How do we get Chatroulette users’ attention?
According to a previous study [15] on Chatroulette, 71%
of its users were male. Female Chatroulette users usually get
more attention from male users. Furthermore, we conducted
an experiment by using a video of an attractive lady sitting
in front of the webcam. Based on our observation, over 95%
of male Chatroulette users passively started a conversation
with us when they saw the video. Therefore, our experiments
introduced above take advantage of this human behavior to
verify the possibility of the proposed attacks.
6. How do we use online social networks to search for
Chatroulette users’ profile?
There are several searching mechanisms on online social
networks that can help an adversary de-anonymize victim’s
privacy. One of the most directed mechanisms is to use
the searching functions that an online social network pro-
vides. For example, Facebook allows users to perform friend
search. Based on the returned results, Facebook also offers a
function that could help users to refine the returned results by
using location information (see Figure 4). In addition, if the
number of the returned results are still in a high range, the
adversary can also use a victim’s personal interests to match
the victim’s profile and thus filter their searching results if
the victim reveals his hobbies during the conversation.
4 Countermeasures
To address these security attacks, we provide some secu-
rity suggestions and possible countermeasures.
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Figure 5. Operations in Chatroulette.
4.1 De-anonymization Countermeasures
As introduced in Section 3.1, the de-anonymization at-
tack mainly uses the victim’s IP address along with vic-
tim’s name and video to carry out a malicious attack. The
most intuitive defense against de-anonymization attacks is
to blur video chat users’ faces and thus protect their iden-
tities. However, this may significantly harm the applicabil-
ity of the face-to-face online conversation service. In addi-
tion, the computation-intensive technique for blurring chat
Figure 4. Search and refine victims by using Facebook.
users’ face may not always work properly. Consequently,
another simple solution which comes to our mind is to hide
users’ IP addresses and suggest a video chat user to use an
alias instead of his actual name before getting into a conver-
sation with a stranger. In general, the simplest mechanism
to anonymize one’s IP address is to harness anonymous ser-
vices (e.g. Tor[16]).
According to our experiment, we however found out that
anonymous services such as Tor do not work when combined
with a service like Chatroulette. As shown in Figure 5, Alice
and Bob send their request for a new chat session (including
IP address and Port) to Chatroulette. Chatroulette uses Al-
ice’s (and Bob’s) IP address and port to generate user IDs
for Alice and Bob respectively. Chatroulette’s server then
sends to Bob the four-tuple (Bob’s ID, Alice’s ID, Alice’s
IP, Alice’s UDP port), and to Alice the four-tuple (Alice’s
ID, Bob’s ID, Bob’s IP, Bob’s port). Bob now has enough
information about Alice to verify that a request for a video
chat did indeed come from Alice, by checking the request
matches Alice’s ID, IP, and port number. This filters out spu-
rious requests for video chats.
However, when Tor software is mounted in any Cha-
troulette user, Chatroulette’s service cannot work properly.
Figure 6 provides a reasonable explanation for why using
Tor doesn’t quite work. Assume that Alice installed a Tor
software on her machine and uses the software to establish a
connection with Chatroulette and Bob. When Alice registers
herself with Chatroulette, the IP address and port number
seen by Chatroulette is from the TOR network. This infor-
mation is then communicated to Bob as Alice’s credentials.
When Alice sends a request to Bob initiate a chat with him,
her packet will include a different IP address and port num-
ber, i.e. if she uses TOR, then her packet’s source IP will
contain a different IP and presumably port assigned by a dif-
ferent TOR proxy. Even if she avoids TOR in talking directly
with BOB, namely uses her own IP and port, there will still
fail to be a match at Bob’s. In either case, the IP address and
port provide by Alice fail to match the ones that Bob has on
record. Therefore, the connection fails.
One possible solution to this problem is to use the same
proxy entity to establish a connection with the Chatroulette
service and the partner. While using the same proxy to es-
tablish connection, the Chatroulette service can generate a
user ID for a Chatroulette user by using the proxy IP ad-
dress and port. Similarly, when the Chatroulette user con-
nects to another user (through the same proxy) that Cha-
troulette assigns, the connection between these two users can
work properly because the IP address and port of the proxy
is compatible with the User ID that Chatroulette assigned.
Here the proxy has to be trusted by two peers. Although the
trusted proxy may perfectly hide a user’s IP address and port,
there is still a potential performance limitation. The ben-
efit of Adobe’s Stratus is to help Chatroulette reduce band-
width costs. Therefore, the involvement of a fixed proxy may
sacrifice Chatroulette users’ performance in terms of band-
width and latency. In addition, we would also suggest a Cha-
troulette user to use an alias to substitute his actual name,
since an alias can make malicious de-anonymization more
difficult.
4.2 Phishing Countermeasures
Intuitively, phishing attacks can be easily detected and de-
fended against. For instance, a Chatroulette user could ask
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Bob ID
Bob IP−Port
IP−PortProxy−H
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IDBob
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IP−PortProxy−Y
Bob
Proxy−Y
Chatroulette
Alice
Proxy−H
Request
Request
Figure 6. Operation of Tor in Chatroulette.
his partner to prove that the video stream he is watching is
real by asking his partner to raise his hand or wink his eyes
etc. However, an adversary can also make an excuse such as
”the network is slow. I raised my hand but you did not see it
...” and thus evade this check. In this case, the Chatroulette
user should ask his partner to maintain a gesture (such as
raising left hand) for a period of time until the frame with the
gesture is transmitted back to the Chatroulette user. In addi-
tion, another intuitive method to detect fake video stream,
though it might not be that efficient and effective, is to check
with audio stream. However, the adversary may have a plau-
sible reason for disabling his audio input devices. Therefore,
we suggest that when meeting a stranger with audio disabled,
the Chatroulette user should verify the authenticity of the
video stream that he watches by requesting a long-lasting
gesture be repeated.
However, a recent movie – Avatar – throws new light on
an advanced phishing attack. Inspired by that movie in which
scientists develop an Avatar program which enables people
to control their own Avatar, an adversary could develop a
program that would control the motion of a realistic-looking
avatar shown in a video stream by either typing on a key-
board or clicking a mouse. In this sense, the attacker’s goal
is to present a fake personae that can pass a video version of
the Turing test [17]. In practice, there have already been sev-
eral game programs that have implemented similar functions
[18]. Notice that the game program uses 2-3D technology to
describe the object in the video rather than the real people.
Another mechanism for preventing phishing attacks is to
identify whether the Chatroulette user that you get a conver-
sation with is using a virtual webcam rather than an actual
webcam. Since the phishing attacks are carried out by using
a virtual webcam to fool Chatroulette users, terminating or
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Figure 7. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks.
identifying the virtual webcam means terminating phishing
attacks. A patch of Tencent QQ[19] has been implemented to
identify virtual webcams in Tencent’s instant messaging ser-
vice platform. The basic idea of this technique is to blacklist
all mainstream virtual webcam software. When a device’s
driver (either an actual device or a virtual device) is installed
on Windows system, the driver will be automatically reg-
istered at the Windows system registry. Since the instant
message software has already blacklisted all the virtual we-
bcams, the instant message software will notice the use of a
virtual webcam to the other user when a virtual webcam is
being used. However, the main drawback of this technique
is inherent from the fact that the Windows system allows its
users to modify their registry. Therefore, an adversary can
easily bypass its detection by changing the virtual webcam
driver’s key value in the Windows system registry into one
that is not shown in the blacklist. The best solution that we
suggest in this paper is to develop a program that could au-
tomatically lock the actual webcam device and disable the
virtual webcam. At present, we are in the middle of the soft-
ware design to distinguish virtual webcams from the actual
webcams.
4.3 Man-in-the-Middle Countermeasures
In the current Chatroulette service, which does not sup-
port anonymous IP addresses, one approach to address MIM
attacks is to seek to verify IP addresses between one another.
Take an example of Alice and Bob. As indicated in Figure 7,
the conversation content between Alice and Bob is relayed
by a malicious user – Carol. For both Alice and Bob, the
connection peer is Carol. Therefore, Alice and Bob are able
to realize that the video streams transmitted in between all
come from Carol’s IP address. If Alice and Bob are able
to exchange the IP address of their incoming video streams,
they could identify that a malicious attack is happening in
between because the IP address that they see is exactly the
same. However, exchanging IP address through the mali-
cious user is difficult for the reason that Carol can modify
the content of the packets that she receives. One solution
is to watermark the IP address of Alice and Bob’s incoming
video streams into their outgoing video streams. In this way,
Bob would receive video watermarked with Alice’s IP source
address, and compare that with the IP address of the source.
If the two do not match, then Bob can suspect a MIM. The
MIM adversary is thus forced to do compute-intensive pro-
cessing on the video stream to extract the existing watermark
and replace it with the MIM’s IP watermark. This raises the
difficulty level on an adversary, though a well-equipped ad-
versary could still overcome such a defense.
Recall the protection mechanism that we introduced in
Section 4.1. The way that we protect de-anonymization at-
tacks is to use a proxy entity. Therefore, there is a possibil-
ity that the protection solution to de-anonymization attacks
can be identified as a MIM attack if Alice and Bob are us-
ing the same proxy to hide their IP address. To address this
problem, a possible solution is to whitelist all the third-party
trusted proxies at the Chatroulette website. Every time, when
a Chatroulette user asks Chatroulette to assign him a partner,
Chatroulette also sends the user the list of those trusted third-
party proxies. So, when the watermarking is the same, Alice
and Bob can first check whether the incoming IP address is
different from the one that has been whitelisted before termi-
nating the conversation.
5 Conclusion
Although video chat systems such as Chatroulette and
RandomDorm have received great attention, we have demon-
strated that current security and privacy issues of these
systems have been neglected. According to our experi-
ments over the Chatroulette platform, we investigated some
potential security and privacy vulnerabilities including de-
anonymization attacks, phishing attacks and man-in-the-
middle attacks and presented the corresponding countermea-
sures. IP anonymization with Tor was proposed as a coun-
termeasure to de-anonymization attacks, but was found to
introduce some compatibility problems with a service like
Chatroulette. Phishing attacks could be counteracted by re-
quiring visible authentication, e.g. raise your right hand, but
a sophisticated adversary could thwart this attack with an
avatar. Virtual webcam detection was offered as an option,
but an adversary could thwart this approach as well. MIM
attacks could be addressed by watermarking videos with the
IP address of their destination.
We have just begun to scratch the surface of interesting
attacks on and countermeasures for video chat systems, and
we hope that this paper will stimulate further discussion on
many new approaches to protecting privacy in video chat sys-
tems. For example, our countermeasures for anonymization
have weaknesses, as do our solutions for phishing attacks.
We have begun to consider cryptographic approaches that
bind more strongly a video chatter’s source address to the
video source. We will probe these problems more deeply as
our future work progresses.
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